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Abstract 
 In recent years, there has been considerable pressure on corporations doing business in South Africa to divest and withdraw from 
that country. While this moral view espouses withdrawal, this article seeks to provide insight into the practical consequences of 
divestment. One of the questions addressed is how does foreign divestment affect Black South Africans, those who are supposed to 
benefit from a divestment policy. 
 
Introduction 
In June 1987, Rev. Leon Sullivan advocated a total change in policy and a plea for a complete corporate withdrawal from South 
Africa. As the widely respected architect of the Sullivan Principles, a code of fair employment tenets for United States companies in 
South Africa, his announcement implied a dramatic reversal of the policy he had advocated for the last decade. To understand the 
reasons for this dramatic reversal in policy, it is necessary to understand the history behind the principles itself. 
More than a decade ago, when Rev. Leon Sullivan, pastor of the Zion Baptist Church in Philadelphia, was elected to the Board of 
Directors of General Motors, he shocked his fellow directors by proposing that GM should get out of South Africa. When he learned 
that it would be impractical for GM to close down its 4500 employee plant and abandon its employees (most of them non-White) to 
fend for themselves, he proposed that GM and other U.S. corporations operate under a stringent code of ethics. The Sullivan Principles, 
as they came to be known, emphasized non-segregation, equal employment practices, equal pay and working conditions, training for 
the advancement of Blacks and other non-Whites (Coloreds and Indians), and the improvement of the quality of life outside the work 
environment. Sullivan’s call for a total withdrawal is an implicit acknowledgement that the principles have not  accomplished what 
they were designed to accomplish, namely, provide Blacks and non-Whites with the economic and social strength to overthrow the 
apartheid system. His call for total withdrawal and the imposition of economic sanctions is now designed to bring economic pressure 
on the White South African Government to end apartheid. However, it is not clear that that will necessarily follow. 
The U.S. involvement in South Africa has been one of the biggest U.S. foreign policy issues in the last three years. Public opinion 
and corporate action have been divided about the issue. There is a strong anti-apartheid lobby (particularly from student groups), that 
advocates the stand that it is morally wrong to remain in South Africa, since any involvement there is construed as indirectly supporting 
apartheid. This lobby has become increasingly strong in the last year. The Wall Street Journal noted that the issue of U.S. involvement 
in South Africa has eventually transcended politics and become a litmus test of moral correctness in U.S. public life.1 These anti-
apartheid activists criticize the Sullivan Principles as being ineffective in dismantling apartheid, and support the imposition of total 
economic sanctions, and divestment, i.e., a total U.S. withdrawal. 
On the other hand, there is a considerable amount of pressure from U.S. corporations against a total withdrawal from South Africa. 
The corporations argue that a total withdrawal would weaken the position of companies that say that they can force change only by 
staying in South Africa. Many companies believe that U.S. involvement in South Africa has benefitted the Blacks substantially. For 
example, Ron Johnson of Kelloggs indicates that it is possible that Kelloggs could stay and help with a peaceful fundamental change 
 and “we believe we can do that, provided we are able to run a successful business.” There are many organizations that share Johnson’s 
views.2 
Consequently, Americans seem to be divided on the issue of U.S. involvement in South Africa. The “moral” view espouses 
withdrawal, while the “practical” view espouses a continued U.S. presence in the region. This paper seeks to provide answers to the 
following questions. What has been the effect of the U.S. presence in South Africa on the socio-economic status of South African 
Blacks? To what extent do sanctions, divestment and disinvestment have the potential to really bring about pressure on the White 
South African government to change its policy of apartheid? What are South African Blacks perceptions of the effect of sanctions and 
divestment? What happens to the businesses that U.S. companies abandon? 
 
Impact of foreign corporations on South African Blacks 
The 240 U.S. firms doing business at the end of 1986 in South Africa employ about 100 000 Blacks, whose families total nearly a 
million people. In more absolute terms, however, direct employment of 100000 Blacks corresponds to only about 2% of the total 
population of South Africa. 
All Sullivan signatory companies now pay Blacks and Whites equally for equal work and report full integration of work areas, 
restrooms, and recreational facilities. But it is in the areas of education, training and social justice that these corporations have made 
some larger impact. In 1985, Sullivan signatory companies averaged roughly $500 per employee for education, training, health and 
welfare. In 1986, Sullivan Reports indicate that the amount spent by companies exceeded $38 million in education, housing and social 
justice. This translates into roughly $842 per Black/non-White employed in U.S. corporations, but only $1.50 when calculated on a per 
capita basis for the country’s total Black population. 
Programs by these corporations include both assistance to their own employees, as well as assistance to the general Black 
population. “In house” assistance incorporates housing, health and education. Shell Corporation of South Africa, a subsidiary of the 
Royal Dutch Shell group based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, for example, provides housing to their employees at 
subsidized rents under $5 monthly. They also maintain elementary schools for some 1500 Black children of employees at their 
Rietspruit coal mining site. General Motors has spent several million dollars in housing assistance, and until education became free in 
1987, GM paid for all books and tuition of all children of its Black employees. Other programs by both American and European 
corporations include free medical assistance, housing loans for its employees and other welfare activities. 
While these programs have a limited impact, since they are employee directed, programs to aid the general Black population have 
been considerable. In the field of education alone, where arguably their impact has been the greatest, in 1986 a total of $17 million 
was spent in education of non-Whites not employed by diese corporations. IBM has instituted a $10 million “writing to read program” 
in 250 schools to assist 37 000 upper elementary black children to make the transition from education in Zulu, Ndebele, Xhosa, Swazi, 
Sutho, Venda, Lemba, and other African languages to English. 
Other corporations have joined the adopt a school program by which 332 deteriorating Black schools have been refurbished and 
supplied with library and learning aids. The University of Capetown and the University of the Witwatersrand, once virtually all White, 
now support some 500 Black students each, largely funded by scholarships established by foreign corporations. Upjohn 
Pharmaceuticals, for example, a manufacturer of medicines and agricultural projects, provides medical textbooks to Black colleges, 
and provides financial support to students in the fields of nursing, pharmacy, medicine, and agricultural technology. The U.S. State 
Department reports that $160 million has been spent on education alone in the last 8 years by these corporations.3 
In the field of training, 3380 non-White private businesses were assisted in 1985 alone, with about $10 million in U.S. corporate 
 funds. Possibly the most dramatic single instance of training was 
Fluor Corporation’s massive project in which more than 20 000 
welders were trained on one site. As a result, many of these welders 
were able to set up welding and related businesses in their 
homelands and villages. Black entrepreneurship has increased about 
700% since 1978, the first reporting year after the Sullivan Principles 
were adopted. 
In other spheres, also, contributions have been made. The NCR 
Corporation has donated $2 million to the Urban Foundation to help 
fund various Black projects, including lobbying, research, self-help 
housing, adult education, and business development IBM, although 
sold to a South African organization, is still expanding its small 
builders loan scheme to Black towns. Michael Levin, Economist and 
Director of the Port Elizabeth Campus of the predominantly Black 
Vista University, indicates that foreign companies operating in the 
Eastern Cape province contributed 25% of the gross regional product 
in 1984. In addition, these organizations provided about 84% of the 
social welfare funds spent outside government budgets that year.4 
However, it still must be borne in mind that all these activities 
constitute a net total of only $1.50 per capital investment, of the total 
Black population. But at least that much is being done. As William D. 
Broderick of Ford Motor Company noted, “The principles have clearly 
fallen short of the ideal, but the record is pretty impressive still.”5 But 
it is clear that the sphere of social responsibility of these corporations, 
whether voluntary or induced, have had some small impact. It is feared 
that disinvestment will terminate many of these social responsibility 
projects. 
There is a perception in the minds of many Americans that it is only 
U.S. companies that are disinvesting in South Africa, while European 
organizations have not been as quick as U.S. corporations to divest 
However, latest reports indicate that there' is mounting pressure in 
Europe for disengagement. The impact of a European withdrawal from 
South Africa will be much greater than a U.S. pull out. Out of the 400 
000 Blacks employed in foreign corporations, some 350000 work for 
European owned corporations. GM, employing about 4000 workers, is 
arguably the largest U.S. employer, although there are at least 20 
European employers who each employ more. (See Tables I and II.) The 
British have the largest involvement in terms of total workers 
employed. 
 European governments have codes similar to the Sullivan Principles, as do other nations. The European Community Code, the 
Canadian, Japanese and Australian codes, are all as stringent as the Sullivan Principles. But it appears that European governments are 
still debating whether a total withdrawal is in the interest of the Black community or not 
 
Sanctions, divestment and disinvestment 
When talking about sanctions, it is necessary first to understand the meaning of the terms that are used before we can clearly 
evaluate their impact. In practical terms, “sanctions” refer to government trade and investment restrictions against South Africa. 
Broadly, it includes stoppage of various governmental sales or purchases to and from the country. However, in the context of the 
current situation in South Africa, the term sanctions appears to be broadly used to include both divestment and disinvestment 
Journals, in fact, tend to use these terms interchangeably when evaluating their impact. 
“Divestment” refers to the sale of ownership rights through the sale of stocks/bonds, in corporations in South Africa, by individuals, 
cities, schools, states, governments and other institutions. 
“Disinvestment” refers to the outright sale of foreign owned businesses in South Africa. The sale could be to local businessmen, 
either Black or White, to employees, or to other larger corporations. While some organizations have been sold, .others, like Eastman 
Kodak, have just stopped their operations in South Africa totally. Hereafter, in the evaluation of the impact of these activities on South 
Africa, the term sanctions shall include divestment and disinvestment activity. 
The United States has been the most active in divestment activity, much of it due to public pressure. By early 1987, about 21 states 
in the U.S. had adopted divestment policies (see Table III). Joining the list of 21 states, 68 U.S. cities have also opted to divest, 55 of 
which have elected to do so within the last two years. Some of the larger cities include Atlanta, Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Los 
Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Washington D.C. Ten highly 
populated state counties have also divested. A total of 100 educational institutions have divested $410 893 546 in funds, with Harvard  
 
University divesting $54 800 000, University of Michigan $51000000, Columbia University $41 700000, University of Minnesota $18191 
763. Many other organizations have also divested funds of corporations doing business with South Africa. Since 1984, about 40 foreign 
corporations have divested, with about 50 in 1986. In 1987, 18 foreign corporations have already divested or disinvested, while 15 are 
in the process of doing so. Yet, about 200 American corporations are still doing business in South Africa.6 
 Sanction activities undertaken by various governments 
On the basis of conclusion No. 4 of the 1985 Report of the Committee on Apartheid by the ILO,7 16 points were identified as 
corresponding to sanctions against South Africa. These range from extension of arms embargo to include sales by South African 
subsidiaries of transnational corporations, prohibition of military sales to South Africa, stopping of all investment guarantees, export 
credits and trade promotion measures, stopping new investment in South Africa, prohibiting and restricting oil supplies through bans 
on ships and tankers to South Africa, banning the sale of Krugerrands, all out bans on purchases from South Africa, and the stopping 
of all sports and cultural contacts with South Africa. By the end of 1986, 92 governments had reported some action on the lines of the 
16 principles, but not one government could conclusively state that it had observed all principles to the utmost extent All governments 
surveyed had indicated varying responses to the principles listed above, and had made varying progress in the spheres of investment 
trade and economic relations, support for neighboring states, and support for national liberation movements. 
There are differences of opinion, amongst industrialists and corporations, on the wisdom or the intended effects of sanctions. 
Within the U.S., opinion on this is clearly divided, although mounting public pressure has moved in the direction of sanctions and 
divestment. For example, while Walter Fauntroy, District of Columbia delegate to the U.S. Congress, strongly supports disinvestment, 
Herman Nickel, U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from 1982 until October 1986, wants U.S. corporations to remain involved there. A 
Gallup Poll survey in September, 1985 indicated that 44% of American citizens voted for impartiality, while 8% press for general 
sanctions, 5% for trade embargoes. 
Of late, other European nations have indicated a desire or movement in this direction. In Europe, until recently, most organizations 
have taken the view against divestment, although it is not clear that the prime motive for this has been helping with the political 
emancipation of the Blacks. However, even those organizations are facing pressure to divest. A change in the mood of European 
companies is reflected by the decision of Barclay Bank (United Kingdom) to divest The reaction in the European Community to Barclay’s 
withdrawal has been mixed. Some support Barclay’s actions, stating that “staying is no longer essential to their concept of social 
responsibility”.8 But European companies are more inclined to be “stayers”, while the Americans are the “quitters”. However, there 
is a subtle trend beginning in Britian, South Africa’s largest foreign investor, toward quiet disengagement. Several smaller British 
organizations have already sold out entirely. For example, Smiths Industries PLC, Valor PLC, Crown House PLC, and some of the bigger 
organizations have already divested their stake in South Africa. Prudential Corporation of Britian swapped its majority in a South 
African branch last fall with Liberty Life Association of South Africa. British Electric Traction Co. has pared its freight and bus businesses, 
while Metal Box PLC has gradually reduced its holdings to only 25% of Metal Box South Africa. Many of these actions have ostensibly 
been to improve the company’s image on the stock market. The banks have also followed this lead. Standard Chartered, now the 
biggest foreign bank in the country, shrunk its holding from 53% to under 40%, while Hill Samuel and Co., which put together more 
South African loans than any other company in 1985, expects to own only 13% of its South African subsidiary by the end of this year.9 
In September 1986, the European Common Market imposed a more stringent set of actions/ sanctions that may act as a further 
restraint on European organizations, although those sanctions may not be as stringent as the sanctions passed by the U.S. Congress 
over President Reagan’s veto. Yet, it is only a few European organizations that feel the compulsion to quit South Africa, unl ike the 
norm in the U.S. An additional disincentive to quit is the fact that unlike the Americans, Europeans can’t retreat into large home 
markets.10 West German companies appear to be eager to fill the void left once the Americans withdraw. Daimler-Benz decided last 
year to spend an additional $75 million in its South African plant. Over the last three years Volkswagen has increased its financial 
contribution in its subsidiary by $200 million. Sir Leslie Smith, who chairs the British Industry Committee on South Africa, pleaded 
against sanctions, saying that they were difficult to enforce, that they could damage the South African economy, add to political 
problems, and lower the standard of living of the population.11 
 Instances of withdrawal from other nations are rarer. An Australian company, Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Corporation, 
announced on January 9, 1987 its decision to disinvest. On March 16, 1987, Norway’s parliament approved an extensive trade ban 
against South Africa. The unilateral boycott, proposed in 1986, gives domestic organizations until September 1987 to cut remaining 
trade ties with South Africa. Sweden has also advocated a trade ban, and Swedish companies have till October 1987 to end trade with 
South Africa. Switzerland has had meetings with Roman Catholics and Protestants to hear church complaints about Swiss loans to 
South Africa. The reaction in the Netherlands appears to be mixed. The Netherlands Reformed Church, the largest Protestant body in 
the Netherlands, is split on whether to withdraw investments in South Africa as a gesture against apartheid. The Royal Dutch Shell 
group indicated on April 16, 1987, that it had no intention of divesting. The Israeli cabinet decided in March 1987 that it will not sign 
any new military contacts with South Africa. Previously, Israel had defended its military ties to South Africa, on the basis of domestic 
need, i.e., divestment would bring an end to Israel’s arms industry and generate unemployment. After a meeting between Japanese 
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Oliver Tambo, leader of the African National Congress, in Tokyo on March 20, 1987, Japanese 
officials indicated that Japan does not favour comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. The spokesman said that the 
Japanese government believes that the people of South Africa would suffer, rather than the government if sanctions were imposed. 
The point of the above discussion is that if this European trend of divestment continues, it will weigh more heavily on the South 
African government than a solely U.S. departure. A U.S. pullout is, at best, a limited effort that will have very little direct impact, 
although it’s indirect effect in terms of publicity could be potentially greater. But the European pullout could have a larger impact, if 
we keep in mind that at least 60% of South Africa’s foreign investment comes from Europe. In the early 1980s European banks lent 
more than a billion dollars in loans to South Africa. These organizations employ more than 350 000 Black workers, out of an 
approximate total of 400000 Black workers employed by foreign corporations. Consequently, apart from having a detrimental effect 
on Black unemployment, a U.S. corporate departure would probably have very little potential to have a lasting impact on the political 
economy of South Africa. 
 
Effects of sanctions on Blacks 
What has been the real impact of sanctions on the Blacks in South Africa? Much of the evidence of the impact on Blacks cannot be 
expressed in quantitative terms. Consequently, we have to depend largely on mixed and anecdotal evidence. In addition, die fact that 
sanctions are detrimental to Blacks itself is a moot point since (hey are designed to be that way. The key question here is not whether 
sanctions are detrimental, but whether Blacks perceive a benefit from their imposition. In other words, does it hurt the Whites? Or, 
does it hurt the Blacks more? 
First, it is clear that with sanctions and divestment, much of the social responsibility expenditures generated by Sullivan adherents 
will be curtailed. Schools will lack funds and without the support of U.S. and other companies, community health projects designed 
for the social and educational emancipation of Blacks in South Africa will come to a halt. 
Second, divestment by definition implies a sale to a locally owned company. The question here is whether locally owned 
organizations will continue the social overhead costs hitherto pledged by foreign organizations. The answer, at best, seems to be that 
they will not. There is evidence to indicate that when local organizations take control of companies sold by foreign corporations, they 
do not necessarily adhere to the Sullivan Principles. Lionel Grewan, Executive Director of the Sullivan Signatory Association, notes that 
the history of divestment is that as soon as a company becomes wholly South African owned, it tends to cut its links with the Sullivan 
Principles. More organizations have been sold to White South African groups rather than Black South Africans. Divestment, when it is 
divestment to Black political-economic empowerment would be good, but when it is to White South Africans, then it loses much of 
the meaning and intention of economic sanctions against South Africa. A report by Eric Wiggin indicates that observers will terminate 
 their Sullivan social responsibility projects for education, community improvement and social justice.12 
One notable exception to selling organizations to White South Africans is the proposed example of Ford Motor Company, where 
the automaker is holding discussions with labor and community leaders regarding its 62% stake in Samcor (South African Motor 
Corporation), the giant South African conglomerate. Ford is basically seeking an alternative to a complete pull out, which will harm 
the employees, 70% of whom are Black Ford is seriously exploring the question of whether its stake can be turned over to its 
employees. At the annual general meeting, Chairman Donald Peterson pointed out that total withdrawal would result in the closure 
of Samcor and the loss of 16000 related jobs. The shareholders of Ford voted against total withdrawal. The logical solution, according 
to Ford officials, appears to be to transfer its holdings to Samcor employees. Labor and community leaders are still debating the idea. 
There is much cause for concern from unions on this issue. The union is concerned that once Ford loosens its ties, Samcor may have 
difficulty competing in South Africa’s overcrowded auto industry. It also questions whether the company would pay sufficient 
dividends to make the share holdings worthwhile. Instead, the union prefers longer term compensation and assurances that pensions 
will still be honored. 
The auto workers, a part of the National Union of Metalworkers, are understandably sensitive to disinvestment moves. In 1985, 
when Ford shutdown its operations in Port Elizabeth, several thousand workers went jobless. When GM disinvested in October 1986 
about 2000 autoworkers went on strike, demanding compensation in case the company, sold to local owners, went under. It will be 
interesting to see how the labor and community leaders react to Ford’s offer, since the potential benefits of selling to workers is much 
better than selling to local, White owned South African firms, especially in the context to a lack of available Black entrepreneurship to 
take over and make Samcor a totally Black owned organization. 
However, most American firms have sold their holdings to local White controlled firms. Buyers include giant conglomerates like 
Premier Corporation, which purchased Dow Chemical Company’s subsidiary, and smaller firms like Northern Engineering, which 
acquired Eaton’s operations. Other U.S. divisions have been sold to White South Africans who managed the subsidiary, or to foreign 
firms. Only a handful of organizations, including Eastman Kodak, have completely shut down their operations. Companies that have 
been sold to Blacks are a rare phenomenon. Coca Cola, was the first American firm to do so. In March 1985, 85% of its wholesalers 
and retailers, 60% of whom are non-White, bought 1/3 of Coke’s South African subsidiary. Ford’s proposed sell off is the only other 
case. 
However, when American companies sell their subsidiaries, they often arrange to supply their parts or products to the new owners. 
According to the Massachusetts based Mitchell Investment Management, 35% of the 106 U.S. subsidiaries sold in the last two years 
continue to sell their goods, through licensing, distribution, franchising or trademark agreements.13 According to a spokesman of 
Mitchell Investment, firms still manage to make a profit, without the expenses of direct involvement, and consequently, many of the 
companies that said they were pulling out really were not. 
The primary effects of divestment/disinvestment on Blacks is reflected in a loss of jobs. U.S. divestitures have caused scattered 
layoffs. Black joblessness, estimatedly increased by 300 000 over the last three years from 3 million. Figures on estimates of 
employment and unemployment are at best, random estimates, many of them not believable. Figures obtained from the government 
of South Africa are suspect. If these sanctions are really hurting the South African economy, the South African government is liable to 
overstate the effect of sanctions on Blacks, in an effort to draw the heat away from the divestment movement The Washington Times 
reports that Black unemployment is estimated at about 2 million, or about 30% of the Black labor force.14 The number of unemployed 
Blacks and Coloreds, has jumped to 81 000, from 31 000 in eight months. The U.S. ban on the importation of South African rock 
lobsters, is crippling the lobster fishing industry in the Cape Province, and could throw about 70 000 Black fishermen out of jobs. 
A study published by the Trade Policy Research Centre in London estimates that broad economic sanctions can increase Black 
 unemployment by almost 14%, and reduce visible export earnings by a quarter15. Their study also estimates that South African GDP 
would be reduced by 7% and domestic use of resources by about 11%. The South African Embassy in the U.S. projects that divestment 
policies have resulted in the loss of 800 000 jobs totally, that supported 4 million workers and their families. Banning the import of 
agricultural commodities alone (including lobster fishing) will result in 446 000 jobs lost that support 2 million workers; and restrictions 
on the import of South African coal will cost 75 000 Black jobs, while the textile ban and iron and steel ban could result in 153 000 jobs 
being löst.16 It is clear, therefore, that sanctions have had an effect on employment, but that effect has been disproportionately felt 
in the economy. More Blacks have lost, and will lose, jobs than Whites. A clear estimate of the impact of sanctions on the 
socioeconomic state of Blacks is still not available. However, the overwhelming anecdotal evidence is sufficient to convince anybody 
that it is hurting the Blacks far more than it is hurting the Whites. 
 
Black reaction to sanctions      
How do Blacks respond to divestment and sanctions? The evidence here also is mixed. Support for sanctions among South Africa’s 
Blacks was never as universally popular as the pro sanctions lobby believed. Public opinion surveys conducted last July by Mark Orkin 
in association with the Capetown based Institute for Black Research,17 found that 1/4 of Blacks supported sanctions even at the cost 
of many jobs, but an overwhelming 48% opposed sanctions if it meant the loss of many jobs. The special commission appointed by 
the South African Catholic Bishops Conference concluded that “it seems logical that black people desperately want to end the 
oppression of apartheid, and are willing to endure some hardship to see this happen. It seems, however, that if the policy is likely to 
produce a loss of their vitally needed jobs, most Blacks prove tentative about pressing the issue”.18 The Commission concludes “it 
cannot be said that Blacks favor sanctions and are prepared to endure the hardship, a view apparently held by a minority only. For 
when the stark reality of loss of jobs is presented, then quite humanly, this spectre forces the preference for sanctions into the 
background”.19 
Chief Minister Buthelezi, a leader of 6.7 million Zulus, notes that “divestment is a recipe for disaster. Our need is for peaceful 
change and foreign investment creates jobs which bring money to Blacks. Money means power. Blacks cannot really achieve their 
political rights on empty stomachs, without a roof over their heads”.20 In addition, Chief Ministers Sskosana (Kwandikde), E. J. Mabuza 
(Kangwane), C. N. Phatide (Suthos), T. K. Mopeli (Suthos), Lennox Sebe (Xhosas), Patrick Mphepho (Vendas), and George Matanzima 
(Xhosas), all tribal chiefs who are heads of state in various Black homelands, all are opposed to sanctions. Together these chiefs 
represent nearly 17 million Blacks. Buthelezi, in a statement on March 11, 198721 went on to say that Black workers were politically 
doped into supporting a strategy they barely understood. He blames Dr. Allan Boesak, Archbishop Tutu, and Chris Dlamini for much 
of the problem. Chief Buthelezi has persistently opposed economic pressure against South Africa. 
Reverend Allan Boesak has been a proponent of sanctions, as well as Archbishop Tutu. However, after the GM withdrawal, even 
Rev. Allan Boesak has been having mixed feelings. He clarified his stand further when he indicated that sanctions and divestment were 
part of a total package that they called for, and not just an isolated strategy.22 In fact, he notes that divestment is fairly low on the 
priority list. What Boesak and Tutu advocate is sanctions that could hit hard at the South African government, things that could be felt 
immediately, such that the government would have no choice but to capitulate. If that can be accomplished, Rev. Boesak claims that 
Blacks will be able to sustain the hardship that is required. Denis Huxley, the Catholic Archbishop of Durban, predicts that sanctions 
and divestments, and the resulting hardships faced by Blacks would precipitate conflicts that could go on for twenty years, and end in 
total devastation of the country. Other opinion leaders tend to support this view. Alan Paton, the author of the internationally 
acclaimed book Cry the Beloved Country, also indicates that sanctions, if they have the effect of putting a man out of work, is disastrous. 
Chris Dlamini, a vice president of one of South Africa’s more radical trade unions, supports sanctions in principle, but is totally 
 opposed to disinvestment He advocates that the disinvestment oriented organizations should discuss with Black labor a way to arrive 
at a solution that will help the Blacks, rather than disinvesting to satisfy public opinion in their own countries. Interviews with 
numerous Black workers also indicate their disillusionment with sanctions. Goodwill Mpizi, a Black worker in the Eastern Cape Province 
seaport of East London, who has been out of a job for ten months, indicates that the mood of the people is changing. “Many of us are 
hungry, and we hurt when we see our families not eating. People are beginning to steal from each other and fight each other instead 
of fighting the government"23. An additional factor contributing to the ill effects of sanctions is the fact that South Africa’s economy 
was hurt by a four year recession even before the anti-apartheid sanctions campaign began. 
Consequently, in a nutshell, the real trouble with sanctions as a political weapon is that it hurts the Blacks more than the Whites. 
 
The effect of sanctions on the economy 
According to Standard Bank’s and Liberty Life’s latest economic, reviews, there is a gradual economic recovery in South Africa in 
1987. The Liberty review believes that a 3% growth in Gross Domestic Product is attainable. Supporting this view is an expected 
moderate rise in private consumption expenditure due to: (a) higher projected revenue from gold and other metals; (b) improved 
agricultural crop sales; (c) Civil servant pay increases; and (d) fiscal stimulus possibly from a reduction in taxes. The Standard Review 
also cited as encouraging, the consistent upward movement of exports, retail sales and manufacturing production, good rains, and 
a healthier gold price and exchange rate, in recent months. A caveat about inflation was also issued. Activity in the foreign exchange 
market has contributed to a stronger rand. There was almost a 40% increase in diamond sales in 1986 over 1985, and the central 
selling organization says this increase results from the continued strong demand for both rough and polished stones, in the second 
case, particularly for larger quality gems.24 
 
The above paragraph was put together from various news reports during January 1987 in South Africa. As is evident, no talk about the 
effects of economic sanctions is mentioned. This description implies that economic sanctions have had practically no effect in general 
on the South African economy. However, considering the extensive news coverage given to the imposition of economic sanctions and 
divestment by various organizations, we would expect the South African economy to be reeling under an economic disaster. What are 
some of the reasons why sanctions do not appear to have had any effect? This section seeks to explore those reasons. 
First, disinvestment has made South African corporations, organizations and managers richer. This has happened because foreign 
corporations have had to sell their organizations, frequently to incumbent managers, but more often to South African conglomerates, 
at very low prices. For example, Anglo American Corporation, one of South Africa’s 5 large conglomerates that dominate the South 
African economy, acquired South Africa’s largest bank, Barclay’s National, from its British parent organization. Anglo paid about $8.06 
for stock trading at $10.30. Through this purchase South Africa will save more than 30 million Rand ($14 million) in foreign dividend 
payments annually. Divestment has also been a boon to the South African Government 
Industrial Complex. Allied Techonics Corp (AL- TRON) acquired ITT (SA) from the U.S. company. In addition, in the last few years, it has 
also acquired a string of other foreign organizations’ subsidiaries, from the U.S., Britain, France and Holland, including Motorola and 
Asea. Such activity has increased the economic strength and power of local White owned corporations. In addition, when freed from 
foreign ownership they gain the ability to bid on defense and government contracts and can also cut out the costly social responsibility 
programs implemented by foreign owners in conformity with Sullivan and other principles. Five large White owned conglomerates 
control most of the economic activity in South Africa, and these are the organizations that have grown fastest consequent to 
divestments. 
Second, and by far the most important reason why sanctions cannot have any major effect, is due to South Africa’s sophisticated 
industrial base and vast mineral resources. Almost 60% of its export earnings are from low volume, high value, difficult to sanction 
items like precious metals, diamonds, and strategic minerals. In addition, South Africa is one of the most self sufficient economies in 
the world. It can generate almost all its annual capital needs internally, and it actually sustained a net outflow of long term capital 
 after 1976 until the government imposed a debt moratorium in mid- 1985. If sanctions are having any effect at all it is in that it is 
forcing South Africa to reorient itself towards increased import substitution. If necessary, at a price, South Africa has the technical 
capacity to build anything. They are reasonably self-sufficient in oil through oil from coal plants that provide 70% of their liquid fuel 
needs. They also produce their own armaments, and actually export arms to 23 countries. 
South African businesses are easily exporting all kinds of sanctionable goods to all parts of the world. Despite sanctions, Far Eastern 
markets and the Soviet Bloc are expected to remain accessible. Coal exports remain steady at about 40 million tons despite decreased 
demand due to the French and Danish embargoes. Steel is also increasingly exported to the Far East Besides, Africa itself is a large 
customer for South African products. South Africa’s tremendous mineral wealth ensures that it has many products that the world 
sorely needs, (see Table IV). 
The rising price of gold is rejuvenating the South African economy.25 The economy, it is said, lives and dies by the price of gold. 
However, the demand for gold is a relatively stable phenomenon. Economists figure for every $10 increase in the price of an ounce of 
gold, South Africa rakes in another $200 million in annual export earnings. During April 1987 gold had risen from about $405 an ounce 
to $445.50 an ounce. This implies that within a month projected 1987 South African export earnings have increased by $800 million. 
For a country facing tight credit restrictions from its international lenden, and various economic sanctions, this is quite a luxury. 
 
A report published by the U.S. Geological Survey highlights South Africa’s global dominance as a source of platinum group metals. 
According to forecasts made, there will be an upsurge in the demand for platinum in Europe, for use in devices for cutting lead in 
petrol as anti-pollution measures from the next year. The fuel emission standards of the U.S. have spread to Europe, and worldwide 
consumption of platinum is expected to increase. The study highlighted the extent of the world’s reliance on the platinum group 
metals, i.e. platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium and osmium. South Africa has 72% of the world’s known and 
 economically mineable platinum with the Soviet 
Union having 26%. The balance 2% is shared between the U.S. 
and Canada (see Tables V and VI). 
Consequently, South Africa has a position of leverage in the 
world’s mineral markets that makes it extremely difficult for 
most countries to cut off all des with South Africa. Gold and 
other precious metals bring in about 75% of South Africa’s 
foreign exchange earnings and contribute 20% to its Gross 
Domestic Product Gold, therefore, and platinum are unlikely 
targets of sanctions. The mineral dependence of the U.S. on 
South Africa is considerable. As a result, these minerals become 
unsanctionable items (see Table VII). While Congress has 
imposed sanctions against the purchase of uranium from South 
Africa, it has not imposed any sanctions on the purchase of the 
“big five”; chromium, manganese, platinum, vanadium and 
cobalt. 
A total trade boycott of all South African business could cost 
South Africa $2.5 billion in foreign exchange and eliminate 300 
000 White jobs. Despite all the bans against purchases of South 
African uranium, the U.S. still processes South African uranium, 
if only for non U.S. customers. When there is a need, a way will 
be found, and that’s why economic sanctions will not have the 
desired effect. 
In addition, South Africa also obtains considerable leverage by 
means of its strategic location. Located on the vital Cape of Good 
Hope sea lane, South Africa holds one of the most tactical 
geographical locations in the world. Control of the Cape yields 
enormous advantages in peace and in war. South Africa also 
possesses the most modem, best equipped strategic ports and 
harbors in the entire African continent. Combined with its location 
and mineral wealth, South Africa represents the most important 
Southern Hemisphere ally to the western world. This becomes 
another reason why the U.S. has to be careful about alienating 
South Africa. A teaming up of the Soviet Union and South Africa 
could potentially shut down the entire western world in about six months, according to Rep. David Mamot (R- VT).26 The recent 
instability of the Suez Canal due to unrest in the Middle East has increased the importance of the Cape sea route. By that route comes 
80% of European NATO’s oil consumption, 80% of its strategic minerals and 25% of its food requirements. 
These factors, therefore, raise no surprise why sanctions are ineffective. The imposition of sanctions could have several other 
effects also on the political processes. Experts estimate that the increased isolation of South Africa from the rest of the world will force  
  
the Whites more to the right, and increase their resistance to attempts to eradicate apartheid. In addition, these sanctions are forcing 
South Africa to become increasingly self sufficient. The more it does so, the less is the ability of foreign governments to pressure the 
South African government With fewer foreign firms and fewer capital imports, the South African economy will grow more slowly than 
otherwise, and that is the extent to which current sanctions may effect The Forbes report27 estimates that instead of growing at the 
rate of 5% to 6% a year, it will grow at the rate of 3% a year. But the fact remains that the economy will still grow. 
Consequently, sanctions do not solve the problem of acting as an economic force to bring about political change. It has not had 
any success in bringing about any major economic impact on the economy. In the final analysis, it has hurt Blacks more than Whites. 
Having already imposed the sanctions, divested or disinvested, the U.S. no longer has much influence in South Africa. 
 
The effects of sanctions on Southern Africa 
The imposition of sanctions on South Africa has also one major and very unpleasant side effect and that is die impact on the 
economies of the countries in Southern Africa. 
This is largely because the countries of Southern Africa are dependent on South Africa in numerous ways. The main countries 
concerned are Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All these countries are heavily reliant on South 
Africa to maintain their import and export trade. Lesotho, for example, is completely surrounded by South African territory and totally 
dependent on South African rail and road transportation. Zambia and Zimbabwe are also dependent to a large extent on South African 
transportation facilities to conduct trade of their goods. If international sanctions result in South Africa closing its borders, the effect 
on these neighboring countries could be disastrous. Factories, mines and commercial farms would progressively shut down. People 
would become unemployed. The tax base would shrink, and inflation would soar. President Queff Masire of Botswana pointed out 
that 90% of Botswana’s imports and exports are channelled through South Africa. Zambia, Zimbabwe and Zaire are heavily reliant on 
South Africa’s road and rail transport systems and its ports (all these are landlocked countries). (See Table VIII.) 
  
Another significant form of dependency is in employment Mr. Shirley Abbot, U.S. ambassador to Lesotho, cites28 that more than 
one million Black Africans from neighboring countries earn their living from South Africa. Their wages are crucial to the economies of 
these neighboring nations. Sanctions would send all these workers back to their countries, resulting in increased unemployment and 
consequent social instability. See Table IX for registered foreign workers in South Africa. As many or more workers work there illegally. 
 
For every wage earning job in Lesotho, six jobs in South Africa are filled by workers from Lesotho and the corresponding ratio for 
Botswana is 3:2 and for Swaziland 2:1. In 1984 Black miners working in South Africa took home to neighboring countries more than 
$400 million in remittances and deferred pay29. This is only from Black miners, and represents a substantial injection of revenues into 
the economies of these developing countries. Further injections come from the contributions from the Customs Union with South 
 Africa. (70% of Lesotho’s government revenue is from this source.) Many plants and factories in these neighboring countries sell goods 
only to South Africa. It is to be borne in mind that 12% of Mozambique’s GNP is earned by Mocambicans working in South African gold 
mines. Consequently it is clear that in deciding about sanctions against South Africa, countries must also assess the impact on Southern 
Africa. 
When talking about sanctions, it may be pertinent to remember the lesson of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). International sanctions 
were enforced against Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. Despite these sanctions, Rhodesia was known to have traded with as many 
 
 
as 60 countries. Sanctions led to the development in Rhodesia of a more dynamic business community, a greater diversification in 
agriculture, the development of import substituting industries and a steady rise in the living standards of the white community without 
a corresponding increase in living standard of the Blacks. Rhodesia’s natural resources were miniscule compared to those of South 
Africa. Their transport and communication network had hardly developed. The sanctions and the lesson of Rhodesia is relevant to the 
South African situation today. Against that background, the effect of the imposition of international sanctions against South Africa will 
be disastrous for the countries of Southern Africa and at best will have only a marginal impact on South Africa itself 
 
Conclusion 
When one looks at U.S. involvement in South Africa, two factors emerge rather clearly. One is that the Sullivan Principles, although 
deemed to be ineffective in dismantling apartheid, did have some positive impact on the economic and social status of Blacks. Total 
withdrawal, on the other hand, has had a disastrous impact on the Blacks, in terms of reductions in Black employment, and social 
welfare programs in the areas of education, welfare, health and training. Furthermore, the imposition of economic sanctions and 
disinvestment has, if anything, only strengthened the economic power of the Whites, and perhaps increased their determination to 
keep apartheid. 
In view of this, it would seem that any change in apartheid must come from within South Africa itself. Indications are that the 
 process has already begun in South Africa. The dramatic announcement by the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church (which provides 
the religious ideology to bind the system together), that its policy of desegregation was a mistake, is liable to hasten the process of 
change considerably. Consequently, U.S. policy on South Africa needs to be reconsidered, and reoriented in terms of how the U.S. can 





1. The Wall Street Journal, 5/29/87, p. 19. 
2. Eric E. Wiggin, ‘American Companies: A Force in Ending Apartheid?’, Family Protection Scoreboard, Special Edition 
on South Africa, 1987 edition, p. 18. 
3. Ibid., p. 19. 
4. The Wall Street Journal, 11/6/86, p. 36. 
5. The Wall Street Journal, 2/11/87. 
6. David Romano, ‘The Divestment Rush’, Family Protection Scoreborad, Special 1987 edition on South Africa. 
7. ILO Committee on Action Against South Africa, 1986, ILO Publications. 
8. The Wall Street Journal, 11/25/86, p. 32. 
9. The Wall Street Journal, 12/3/86. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Op. cit., Eric Wiggin. 
13. Op. cit., Wall Street Journal, 12/3/86. 
14. The Washington Times, 11/17/86. 
15. The Wall Street Journal, 11/25/86. 
16. Gene Vosseler, ‘Consequences of Sanctions and Disinvestment’, Special 1987 edition on South Africa, Family 
Protection Scoreborad, 1987. 
17. The Wall Street Journal, 2/11/87. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
20. 2" Business and Society Review, Spring, 86, No. 57.  
21. Op. eit 
22. 22 Transcript of Interview with Allan Boesak, March 25, 1987, PB.S. Network, MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour. 
23. 25 Ibid. 
24. The Wall Street Journal. 
25. The Wall Street Journal. 4/23/87. 
26. David, Romano, 'Strategic Importance of South Africa’, Special Edition on South Africa, Family Protection Scoreboard. 
27. Forbes Magazine, ‘Economic Sanctions Are Not Working’, Report from South Africa, 3/9/87. 
28. South African Facts Sheet, March 1986. South African Editorial Services, (PTU) Ltd. 
29. South African Embassy, Washington, D.C. 
